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MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER NON-SERVICE
CONNECTED OFFENSES
The traditional test of whether the military had the necessary jur-
isdiction to try an accused was whether that individual could be classed
as falling within the category, "land and naval forces."1 The Supreme
Court used the term "status" to describe this category, and this was
all that was necessary to confer jurisdiction on a military court-mar-
tial.2 If a person were an active duty member of the armed forces, he
possessed "status" as to any offenses charged while on active duty.3
However, the growing awareness of the courts that individual constitu-
tional rights must be afforded the widest possible application has led
to a conflict with this traditionally military sphere of jurisdiction.4 In
O'Callahan v. Parker,5 the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
where the jurisdictional line should be drawn between civilian trials
which afford full constitutional rights and trial by courts-martial
which do not.6 The Court considered whether court-martial jurisdic-
tion was properly invoked where a serviceman committed a felony,
cognizable in civilian courts, that had no "military significance
' 7 ex-
cept that the individual satisfied the "status" requirement. In decid-
ing that the military must establish "status" plus an identifiable mili-
ary interest to obtain jurisdiction, the Court has taken the view that
full constitutional rights must be afforded, absent a showing of inter-
ference with the military apparatus.8 The extent to which this interfer-
ence must be demonstrated is and will continue to become apparent
through decisions of the Court of Military Appeals and perhaps by
future Supreme Court decisions.9
'U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
2Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ex parte Quirin, 817 U.S. 1 (1942); Grafton v. United States,
2o6 U.S. 333 (107); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895); Smith v. Whitney, 116
U.S. 167 (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509 (1878); see Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
sKinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
4O'Callahan v. Parker, 89 S. C1. 1683, 686 (1969).
'89 S. Ct. 1683 (1969).
OThe Supreme Court was concerned in this case with the loss of rights to
indictment by grand jury and trial by petit jury under the fifth and sixth
amendments.
789 S. Ct. at 1685.
sId. at i6go-g.
9A serviceman may challenge the jurisdiction of the court-martial which tried
him only when he has exhausted his remedies under the system of military law.
[Vol. XXVII
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O'Callahan, then an Army sergeant, was convicted of attempted
rape, housebreaking and assault with intent to rape.10 O'Callahan had
status as an active duty soldier, but when the offense was committed,
he was off-duty, in civilian clothes and not related to the military in
any other demonstrable way. A court-martial sentenced him to ten
years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonor-
able discharge. This sentence was approved by the Army Board of
Review, and the case was affirmed by the United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals.l The case entered the federal court system on petition
for a writ of habeas corpus which was denied in the district court 2
and also in the court of appeals.' 3 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari and subsequently reversed the lower courts' rulings.14
Despite the fact that no case has arisen wherein a member of the
armed services challenged his conviction on jurisdictional grounds, a
series of cases where the party involved did not have "status" has cov-
ered the subject of proper military jurisdiction.'5 Over a quarter of a
century ago, in Ex parte Quirin'6 the Court stated that the first amend-
ment clause, "cases arising in the land or naval forces," authorized trial
by court-martial of all members of the armed forces for all classes of
crimes. Under the fifth and sixth amendments, these crimes might
otherwise have been deemed triable in a civil court.' 7 More recent de-
cisions upholding challenges to military jurisdiction by persons not
having "status" seem to have strengthened the position that "status"
is the sole criterion for establishing that jurisdiction.18 The cases sug-
gest that jurisdiction over the person is all that is required, without any
need to establish jurisdiction over the offense.
In Toth v. Quarles'9 a soldier was tried by a court-martial after his
Following adverse consideration of his case by the United States Court of Military
Appeals, he may enter the federal system at the district court level on petition for
a writ of habeas corpus and later appeal to the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court as O'Callahan did. D. WALKER, MILITARY LAW 400 (1954).
1 O'Callahan was convicted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice arts.
8o, 130, 134, 1o U.S.C. §§ 88o, 930, 934 (1964).1 United States v. O'Callahan, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 568, 37 C.M.R. 188 (1967).
nUnited States ex tel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
13United States ex tel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 39o F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1968).
1489 S. Ct. at 1692.
21See Kinsella v. United States ex tel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (196o); Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
1317 U.S. 1 (1942).
2-Id. at 43.
1KInsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (ig6o); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
"350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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discharge for an offense committed prior to his discharge. The Court,
in upholding his jurisdictional challenge, said that the powers granted
to Congress to make rules to regulate the land and naval forces act to
restrict court-martial jurisdiction to those actually members of the
armed forces.2
0
In Reid v. Covert2' a dependent of a serviceman had murdered her
husband while living with him at his duty station abroad. She was con-
victed by a court-martial of murder. In upholding her challenge to the
jurisdiction of the court-martial, the Court, relying on Toth, held that
dependents could not be classified as falling within the category "land
and naval forces."'22 Kinsella v. United States ex rel Singleton23 held
that the test for jurisdiction is one of status; namely, whether the ac-
cused in a court-martial proceeding is a person who can be regarded as
falling within the term "land and naval forces." In Kinsella the gov-
ernment sought to distinguish Reid on the ground that military au-
thorities may try a civilian-dependent by court-martial for non-capital
offenses.2 4 In rejecting this distinction, the Court stated:
Without contradiction, the materials furnished show that mili-
tary jurisdiction has always been based on the "status" of the ac-
cused, rather than on the nature of the offense. To say that mili-
tary jurisdiction "defies definition in terms of military 'status'"
is to deny unambiguous language of Art. I, § 8, d. 14, as well as
... the precedents with reference thereto.2 5
These cases suggest that military jurisdiction is determined solely on
the basis of jurisdiction over the person and that the grant of power to
Congress under clause 1426 "bears no limitation as to offenses.
'2
In O'Callahan, the Court was faced with the contention that mili-
tary jurisdiction is properly obtained only where there is a demonstrat-
ed connection between the offense committed and the accused's status
as an active duty member of the armed forces. This contention clearly
defined two opposing positions and called for a definition of the cor-
rect jurisdictional grounds by the Court. On the one hand, the military
contended that all members of the armed forces affect the reputation,
discipline and morale of the service by their conduct, and hence, trial
20Id. at 15.
"354 U.S. 1 (1957).
2Id. at 19-2o.
33 6 1 U.S. 234 (ig6o). Thus "status" of the victim was irrelevant to a determina-
tion of "service connection."
.%Id.
2Id. at 243.
OU.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8.
27361 U.S. at 246.
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by court-martial is proper for offenses covered by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice and committed under any circumstances by a member
of the armed forces. More succinctly, the military claimed that any
offense committed by a serviceman is ipso facto contrary to legitimate
military interests and warrants court-martial jurisdiction. On the other
hand, there is the principle that individual constitutional rights should
be given the widest possible application. 28 It has been held that
"status" created an exception to this principle.29 In O'Callahan the
Court, in effect, reversed the presumption necessary to obtain military
jurisdiction. Where it was formerly presumed that an offense com-
mitted by a military member violated a legitimate military interest,
the burden is now on the military to show a legitimate interest in the
form of what the Court called a "service connection."30 Without this
affirmative showing on the part of the military, jurisdiction is never
obtained.
31
O'Callahan specified a number of instances wherein service con-
nection might be properly obtained. Rather than establishing a con-
crete standard for the military and lower civilian courts to follow, the
Court gave examples that illustrate a philosophy and concept of serv-
ice connection. The application of this broad principle through the
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals and perhaps through future
decisions by the Supreme Court will serve to outline more clearly the
circumstances that will give rise to service connection.
The Court strongly emphasized that O'Callahan was on an au-
thorized pass when the offense was committed,32 leading to the con-
clusion that had he been absent without leave (AWOL) a different
result may have been obtained.33 However, in applying the principle
of O'Callahan, the Court of Military Appeals has refused to uphold
military jurisdiction over an offense where an accused is absent without
leave and there is no other service connection.34 The military court
decided that crimes committed in an AWOL status are cognizable in
civilian courts and show no military interest sufficient to justify court-
martial jurisdiction. This view seems to be consonant with O'Callahan.
23See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 US. 194 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(i96o); Tally v. California, 362 U.S. 6o (i96o), Schneider v. New Jersey, 3o8 U.S.
147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
2Cases cited note 2 supra.




"United States v. Chandler, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested
69-24 JALS 6); United States v. Borys, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 4o C.M.R. - (1969,
digested 69-22 JALS 3).
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Abuse of military position was mentioned by the Supreme Court
as leading to service connection. 35 In a recent case,36 a soldier used his
military uniform and status to obtain an automobile from a dealer on
a trial basis. He then stole the auto. In upholding trial by court-mar-
tial, the Court of Military Appeals stated that the military interest in
preventing such use of the good name of the service was sufficient to
show service connection.3 7 That the military should be able to prevent
its members from using their status as soldiers to facilitate perpetration
of crime seems to be within the spirit of O'Callahan.
Crimes committed on a military post were mentioned in O'Calla-
han as leading to a conclusion that there was service connection.38 Be-
cause these are not crimes that are normally cognizable in a civilian
court,3 9 the distinction seems to be a valid one. United States v. Smith40
has supported this view. In that case, a serviceman was convicted of
unlawful carnal knowledge of a daughter of another serviceman. The
offenses charged were committed both off and on the military reserva-
tion. The military court reversed the convictions for acts committed
off-post as not being service connected. However, it affirmed the con-
victions for acts committed on-post, reasoning that there was legitimate
military interest in maintaining "the security of a military post." 41 In
a similar case the court rejected the claim by the military that service
connection was present due to the fact that the victim was the depen-
dent of another soldier and that the contact was facilitated by the ac-
cused's military status.42 The victim's own testimony demonstrated that
the acts were in no way predicated on either the accused's status as a
serviceman or her own status as a dependent.43 Even had the evidence
been to the contrary, it is doubtful that jurisdiction based on the vic-
tim's status as a military dependent alone could have been obtained
under O'Callahan.
589 S. Ct. at 1691.
3United States v. Peak, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-25
JALS 3-4).
3TId.
889 S. Ct. at 1691.
3"There may be situations where there is concurrent jurisdiction in military
and state authority due to a portion of a military installation being leased from
a state.
"18 U.S.C.MA. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-24 JAIS 2); see United
States v. Shockley, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-24 JALS 3-4).
-United States v. Smith, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-24
JALS 2).





The Supreme Court gave some further examples of cases where
there might be legitimate military interest wherein service connection
could be properly invoked. It suggested that where the victim of the
crime was performing duties related to the military, jurisdiction would
be valid. 44 It may be a legitimate military interest to prevent service-
men from committing offenses against civilians who perform services
that are essential to the armed forces. The contact these civilians have
with the military must be established as the principal factor leading to
commission of the crime. Additional circumstances mentioned by the
Court as warranting jurisdiction were: where the war power is applic-
able;45 where the occupied zone of a foreign country is involved;46 and
where the offense charged is the result of a flouting of military au-
thority.47 All of these give amplification to the principle of O'Callahan.
In examining the offenses charged to determine whether service
connection is present, the Court of Military Appeals has reached
some conclusions that seem to be violative of the holding in
O'Callahan. These must be analyzed as to whether they are within
the ambit of the decision. In recent decisions the Court of Military
Appeals has held that use and possession of marijuana are inherently
service connected due to their deleterious effect on military discipline.
48
The court has deemed other drug offenses to be non-service connect-
ed,40e.g., off-post importing and transporting.50 However, it continues
to treat possession and use as service connected. 51 Whether an indivi-
dual who is accused of the use of marijuana while on leave, many miles
from his post, can be properly convicted by a court-martial is question-
able under O'Callahan. Certainly the burden is on the government to
show a clear case of detriment to the armed forces.
Another instance of interpolation by the Court of Military Appeals
with regard to O'Callahan concerns the area of petty offenses. In a
recent case, the court held that petty offenses are always triable by






'sUnited States v. Rose, i8 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-25
JALS 7-8); United States v. Castro, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested
69-24 JALS 4); United States v. Konieczko, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969,
digested 69-20 JALS 9); United States v. Nabors, 10 U.S.C.M.A. 27, 29, 27 C.M.R.
101, 1o3 (1958).
"United States v. Beeker, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested 69-23
JALS 1-2).
r"Unless, of course, the importing or transporting occurred on-post where it
could be considered "service connected."
GCases cited note 47 supra.
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court-martial. 2 In arriving at this decision, the court observed that
O'Callahan was concerned with the loss of fifth and sixth amendment
rights by servicemen when trial is by court-martial. Since some of these
rights are not afforded persons accused of minor offenses by the states,
5 3
the court concluded that they were not within the contemplated scope
of O'Callahan.54 A reason for this position may have been to allow the
military to retain jurisdiction over those minor offenses which require
neither lengthy incarceration nor discharge from the service. This ap-
proach allows the military services to use their facilities for restraint
and discipline and to retain continued presence of the military mem-
ber, avoiding any disruption of the movement of personnel. To do
otherwise could result in ships sailing without full crews or units leav-
ing without full complements. Particularly in crowded port cities and
replacement centers this could be a severe problem. This conclusion,
although undoubtedly in the best interests of the military, seems to be
inconsistent with the holding in O'Callahan, which makes no distinc-
tion on the basis of the type of offense charged. O'Callahan requires
establishment of an identifiable military interest for any offense in
which the military attempts to invoke court-martial jurisdiction. 55
The United States Supreme Court has evidenced its mounting con-
cern that constitutional rights should enjoy the widest possible applica-
tion.506 It is against this background that O'Callahan must be viewed.
Where the military formerly exercised personal jurisdiction over all
servicemen without regard to the offense committed, it now must af-
firmatively show that an area of legitimate military interest has been
invaded. As the Court stated, it must show "service connection." Al-
though some clarification may be needed with regard to the applica-.
tion given O'Callahan by the United States Court of Military Appeals,
the principle remains sound. United States servicemen cannot be de-
prived of their constitutional rights via court-martial without appropri-
ate justification in terms of harm done to the armed forces.
ROBIN PHILIPs HARTMANN
r4United States v. Sharkey, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested
69-25 JALS 6).
r'E.g., Cheff v. Schnackenburg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); Shillitani v. United States,
384 U.S. 364 (1966); United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964); District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S.
63 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
"United States v. Sharkey, 18 U.S.C.M.A. -, 40 C.M.R. - (1969, digested
69-25 JALS 6).
r89 S. Ct. 1691-92.
r$See cases cited note 28 supra.
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